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Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) (U.S. GFC)1 
 
Manuel León Hoyos2,3 
Yale Program on Financial Stability Case Study 
March 20, 2019; Revised: October 10, 2020 
Abstract 
The 2007–09 financial crisis reached a critical stage in March 2008. Amid falling house prices 
and downgrades of mortgage-related securities, financial markets became severely 
disrupted. The Federal Reserve—the US central bank—became increasingly concerned 
about the inability of the 20 primary dealers, including the five largest US investment banks, 
to fund themselves in short-term funding markets, such as the repurchase agreement 
market, then estimated at $10 trillion. In response, the Fed created several emergency 
lending facilities to restore market liquidity that required the Fed to invoke Section 13(3) of 
the Federal Reserve Act. The Term Securities Lending Facility authorized the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York to lend to primary dealers up to $200 billion of highly liquid US 
Treasuries against collateral that was particularly illiquid at the time. Eligible collateral 
initially included triple-A private-label mortgage-backed securities but was later broadened. 
In July 2008, an additional $50 billion was allocated for a TSLF Options Program. The TSLF 
operated between March 27, 2008, and February 1, 2010. Usage peaked at $236 billion in 
October 2008. Overall, 18 of the 20 primary dealers participated and the Fed collected $781 
million in fees. 
Keywords: Federal Reserve, central bank, financial crisis, lending facilities, lender of last 
resort, market liquidity
____________________________________________________________________ 
1 This case study is part of Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project modules 
considering the responses to the global financial crisis that pertain to market liquidity programs. 
Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-
financial-crises/. 
2 Manuel León Hoyos – Research Associate, YPFS, Yale School of Management.  






At a Glance 
In March 2008, financial markets became 
severely disrupted amid falling house 
prices and downgrades of mortgage-
related securities. Particularly distressed 
was the repurchase agreement (repo) 
market, then estimated at $10 trillion. The 
Federal Reserve (the Fed)—the US central 
bank—concerned about the inability of 
primary dealers to obtain funds, invoked 
the emergency powers of Section 13(3) of 
the Federal Reserve Act (FRA), last used 
during the Great Depression, to act as 
lender of last resort to nondepository 
institutions. The Term Securities Lending 
Facility (TSLF) was the first of many 
emergency lending facilities during the 
crisis.  
The TSLF was used by the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York (FRBNY) to lend to its 20 
primary dealers, including the largest five US investment banks and the US securities arms 
of foreign financial institutions, up to $200 billion of highly liquid US Treasuries against 
collateral that was relatively illiquid at the time. In view of the great demand for US 
Treasuries as a “safe haven,” the TSLF was intended to restore market liquidity, particularly 
for the repo market. 
The list of eligible collateral initially included triple-A private-label mortgage-backed 
securities (MBS) but was later expanded. In July 2008, an additional $50 billion was allocated 
for a TSLF Options Program (TOP). In September 2008, a day prior to the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers—the largest bankruptcy in US history—the Fed greatly expanded TSLF eligible 
collateral to include any investment-grade securities (BBB- or higher). TSLF utilization 
intensified, reaching its peak of $236 billion in October 2008. The TSLF operated until 
February 1, 2010. Overall, 18 primary dealers participated and the Fed collected 
$781 million in fees. 
Summary Evaluation 
Since the TSLF was one of many emergency lending facilities deployed during the 2007–09 
financial crisis, it is hard to evaluate its direct impact on financial markets generally. The 
effect of the TSLF announcement on market participants was mixed. While Fed Chairman 
Bernanke (2015) thought it calmed the markets, US Treasury Secretary Paulson (2010) 
thought that “the opposite happened.” Fleming, Hrung, and Keane (2010) and Hrung and 
Seligman (2011) argued that the TSLF contributed to the reduction of stress on repo 
markets. Recently, Carlson & Macchiavelli (2018) conducted further analysis of the TSLF. 
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose: To promote liquidity in the financing 
markets for Treasury and other collateral and thus to 
foster the functioning of financial markets more 
generally 
  
Announcement Date March 11, 2008 
Operational Date March 27, 2008 
End of Issuance 
Window  
February 1, 2010 
Legal Authority Sections 13(3) and 14 of the 
Federal Reserve Act 
Peak Utilization  $236 billion on October 1, 
2008 
Participants Primary dealers of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York 
Administrator Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York 
Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) 
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Term Securities Lending Facility:  United States Context 
 
GDP 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP 
in LCU converted to 
USD) 
 
$14,681.5 billion in 2007 




GDP per capita 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP 
in LCU converted to 
USD) 
 
$47,976 in 2007 





rating (5-year senior 
debt) 
 


















Size of banking 
system 
 
$9,231.7 billion in total assets in 2007 




Size of banking 
system as a 
percentage of GDP 
 
62.9% in 2007 




Size of banking 




Banking system assets equal to 29.0% of 
financial system in 2007 
Banking system assets equal to 30.5% of 
financial system in 2008 
 




of banking system 
 
43.9% of total banking assets in 2007 
44.9% of total banking assets in 2008 
 




in banking system 
22% of total banking assets in 2007 
18% of total banking assets in 2008 
 




ownership of banking 
system 
 
0% of banks owned by the state in 2008 
 
Source: World Bank, Bank Regulation and 
Supervision Survey 
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Existence of deposit 
insurance 
100% insurance on deposits up to $100,000 
for 2007 
100% insurance on deposits up to $250,000 
for 2008 
 









The financial crisis that started in the second half of 2007 entered a critical stage in March 
2008. Financial markets became severely disrupted and credit was scarce and expensive. 
Amid falling house prices and downgrades of mortgage-related securities, lenders limited 
their exposure to only the safest securities. Bear Stearns Companies, the fifth-largest 
investment bank with $400 billion in assets, teetered on the brink of collapse (GAO 2011; 
Geithner 2014). 
Primary dealers4 such as Bear Stearns were particularly vulnerable as they relied on the 
repurchase agreement (repo) market for funding (Gorton and Metrick 2012). A repo 
transaction is basically a short-term loan in which a firm sells a security to another firm with 
the agreement to buy it at a later date for a slightly higher predetermined price. These 
transactions occur on a very short-term basis, typically overnight.  
By March 2008, the repo market, estimated at $10 trillion at the time, had become illiquid 
(Gorton and Metrick 2010). Primary dealers struggled to obtain financing, as they could no 
longer sell a large portion of their securities (Geithner 2014). Rates for overnight borrowing 
of instruments such as Treasury securities, agency debt securities, and agency mortgage-
backed securities (MBS) rose from an average of less than 10 basis points (bps) to more than 
60 bps (Fleming, Hrung, and Keane 2010). The Federal Reserve (the Fed)—the US central 
bank—became concerned about market liquidity and the functioning of financial markets 
(Federal Reserve 2008a). 
On March 7, 2008, the Fed introduced the Single-Tranche Term Repurchase Agreements 
program,5 which allocated up to $100 billion to conduct term (28-day) repurchase 
agreements with primary dealers. This program excluded private-label mortgage-related 
securities and accepted only high-quality collateral, eligible in the Fed’s regular open market 
operations (OMOs) in which the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) trades 
overnight securities with its primary dealers. The Fed, through the FRBNY, crafted a new and 
larger program, the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF), intended to support primary 
dealers. In view of the great demand for US Treasury securities as a “safe haven,” and to 
reduce the need for a fire sale of illiquid assets, the FRBNY would lend highly liquid US 
Treasury securities at a 28-day term—much longer than the typical overnight term—and 
against a broader range of collateral (Federal Reserve 2008a; Geithner 2014). Throughout 
the crisis, the Fed created multiple emergency lending facilities intended to restore market 
liquidity, such as the TSLF.6,7 
____________________________________________________________________ 
4 Primary dealers are about 20 securities firms that the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) has 
designated to trade US government securities on a regular basis. Most primary dealers are affiliated with banks. 
However, this doesn’t give them access to the Federal Reserve’s discount window. The discount window is 
available only to legal entities that are depository institutions. US securities firms had limited ability to source 
liquidity from their bank affiliates during the crisis. For that reason, the Fed believed it needed to create 
programs like Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) to promote market liquidity by lending directly to 
securities firms. 
5 For information about the Single-Tranche Term Repurchase Agreements program, see: 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_tranche.htm. 
6 For a crisis timeline and info on Fed’s actions, see https://www.stlouisfed.org/financial-crisis/full-timeline. 
7 For TSLF information, see Federal Reserve 2018 and FRBNY 2018a. 
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Program Description 
On March 10, 2008, a week prior to a scheduled regular meeting of the Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC), Fed Chairman Bernanke convoked an emergency conference call. 
Financial market disruptions rushed the Fed to speed up the creation of emergency lending 
facilities. That same day, with a unanimous vote of the five sitting Board Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System and a 9–0 vote of the FOMC, the TSLF was approved. The Fed 
invoked the emergency powers of Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act (FRA) that 
permitted it to lend to nondepository institutions “in unusual and exigent circumstances” 
(Federal Reserve 2009). The TSLF was announced a day later, on March 11, 2008, although 
without any reference to Section 13(3) or emergency authority. The Fed “worried that 
trumpeting the invocation of emergency powers last used in the Depression would deepen 
the panic” (Bernanke 2015). 
Under the TSLF, the FRBNY was able to lend primary dealers as much as $200 billion in 
highly liquid US Treasury securities such as Treasury bills, notes, bonds, and inflation-
indexed securities. The facility took advantage of existing infrastructure and had some 
similarities in design to the FRBNY’s open market operations. The FRBNY pulled out US 
Treasury securities for the operation of this facility from the System Open Market Account 
(SOMA) (Federal Reserve 2009). However, it took two weeks for the facility to become 
operational. In the meantime, JPMorgan Chase & Company acquired Bear Stearns for $2 per 
share with emergency assistance from the Fed.8 
The FRBNY offered to lend US Treasury securities at a 28-day term (in some cases adjusted 
for holidays) against a broader range of collateral. Initially, the list of eligible collateral 
included illiquid collateral at the time, such as triple-A private-label residential MBS and 
commercial MBS, as well as agency collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs) (FRBNY 
2008a). By awarding loans through auctions, the Fed intended to encourage broad 
participation and avoid any stigma in using this facility. The TSLF consisted of weekly 
auctions (Thursdays at 2 p.m. ET) in which bids represented the fee dealers intended to pay 
to loan the offered US Treasury securities. At the end of each auction, the FRBNY awarded 
loans at a uniform fee, based on the “stop-out rate,” which was the lowest accepted bid. 
TSLF auctions started on March 27, 2008, and were classified into two categories: Schedule 
1 and Schedule 2. While Schedule 1 auctions accepted all collateral eligible in the FRBNY’s 
open market operations, Schedule 2 auctions offered a larger amount of US Treasury 
securities, accepted a much broader and less liquid range of collateral, and required a higher 
minimum bid. The two different schedules were intended “to better calibrate the interest 
rate on TSLF loans to the level of risk associated with the collateral” (GAO 2011). 
Section 14 of the Federal Reserve Act already allowed the FRBNY to trade securities eligible 
for Schedule 1 auctions for purposes of OMOs. However, the TSLF required FRA Section 
13(3) approval because, in expanding the collateral for Schedule 2 auctions to include types 
of securities that were not authorized in the FRBNY’s open market operations, it was lending 
to nondepository institutions (the primary dealers) for the purpose of acting as their lender 
of last resort. 
The Fed used the clearing services of the existing clearing banks in the triparty repo market, 
JPMorgan Chase and Bank of New York Mellon Corporation. The clearing banks acted as 
____________________________________________________________________ 
8 The price settled at $10 per share. The Fed facilitated a $30 billion emergency loan to JPMorgan Chase. 
Between March 10 and March 13, Bear Stearns had experienced a depletion of its cash reserves from $18 billion 




intermediaries and provided the daily services of custody and valuation of collateral. The 
services of the clearing banks came at no charge to the Federal Reserve or borrowers 
(Federal Reserve 2009). 
Participation in the TSLF was voluntary and undisclosed. In July 2010, however, the US 
Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-
Frank), which requires the Fed to disclose information about OMOs and discount window 
borrowers, two years after transactions occur. For emergency lending facilities under 
Section 13(3) authority, the Fed is required to disclose information of borrowers a year after 
the facility ends (Federal Reserve 2010).9  
The day before a TSLF auction, the FRBNY announced the amount of US Treasury securities 
offered, which ranged between $25 billion and $75 billion. TSLF auctions lasted for 30 
minutes, and the results on awards and stop-out rates were communicated shortly 
thereafter (Federal Reserve 2008a). 
Schedule 1 auctions imposed a minimum bid of 10 bps, while Schedule 2 required a higher 
minimum of 25 bps. There was no cost to place a bid. Dealers could place up to two bids, with 
a minimum amount of $10 million and a maximum of 20% of the total offered amount. In 
case of two bids, they could only be in increments of $10 million. The FRBNY awarded loans 
in full for bids above the stop-out rate and on a pro rata basis for bids at the stop-out rate 
and held the right to refuse any bid at its own discretion. Dealers were not allowed to 
terminate a loan early (FRBNY 2009). 
The FRBNY imposed margins (haircuts)10 on all collateral. The TSLF terms and conditions 
stipulated the daily revaluation of collateral by the clearing banks to make sure the specified 
margins were applied. Every day, the clearing banks conducted the valuation of collateral. In 
case the value of the collateral decreased, the FRBNY could ask for substitutions. On the other 
hand, primary dealers could also substitute collateral for oth0er eligible collateral if needed. 
To value the pledged collateral, clearing banks used the lowest price available in their 
valuation systems. This reduced the risk for the Fed in case of bankruptcy of a borrowing 
primary dealer. The loans were recourse. That is, in case of default, the Fed could come after 
the primary dealer’s assets to claim the difference between the liquidation of the pledged 
collateral and the value of the loan (GAO 2011) 
With the escalating strains on financial markets, on July 24, 2008, the FOMC arranged a 
conference call and voted to extend the TSLF until January 30, 2009. The FOMC also 
approved the TSLF Options Program (TOP) as an extension to the TSLF.11 The TOP was 
announced on July 30, 2008. It required administrative changes pursuant to Schedule 2 
auctions and not another Section 13(3) authorization (Federal Reserve 2009). The new 
program authorized the FRBNY to offer through auctions the option to borrow US Treasury 
securities for a seven-day term, two to three weeks after the auction date and at a fixed rate. 
The TOP intended to provide primary dealers some relief during periods of “heightened 
collateral market pressure, such as quarter-end dates” (Federal Reserve 2018). TOP auctions 
started in late August 2008 and required a minimum bid of 1 bp; all Schedule 2 collateral 
was eligible. The facility was limited to $50 billion in US Treasury securities, on top of the 
____________________________________________________________________ 
9 For the Fed’s disclosures, see 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_quarterly_transaction.htm. 
10 A margin or haircut requires the pledged collateral to be of greater value than the securities borrowed.  
11 Only Governor Plosser dissented. He considered “the net benefit of the TSLF options as being insufficient to 
justify adding them to the support already being provided to market liquidity.” See 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/annual08/pdf/AR08.pdf. 
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$200 billion of Schedule 1 and Schedule 2 auctions. The day before each TOP auction, the 
FRBNY announced the terms and conditions, including the fixed rate of the loans. 
On September 14, 2008, a day prior to the failure of Lehman Brothers—the fourth largest 
investment bank and largest bankruptcy in US history—the Fed took another expansionary 
step.12 With financial markets in disarray, TSLF Schedule 2 eligible collateral was expanded 
to include all investment-grade debt securities (BBB- or higher) and auctions increased from 
$125 billion to $150 billion per month. Schedule 2 auctions started to run weekly, instead of 
biweekly, until the end of April 2009, when they returned to a biweekly basis. In the January 
2009 FOMC meeting, the TSLF was extended until October 2009 (Federal Reserve 2009). 
By June 2009, financial markets showed significant signs of improvement. Effective July 1, 
2009, the Fed suspended TSLF Schedule 1 and TOP auctions. The TSLF size was reduced to 
$75 billion for Schedule 2 auctions, which decreased from biweekly to once a month. After 
July 16, 2009, auctions received no participation. The last auction took place on January 7, 
2010. While the TSLF was in operation, the Fed published information on the total amount 
of propositions, awards, stop-out rate, and bid-to-cover ratio of each auction, but it did not 
disclose the identity of the participant primary dealers or the bid propositions (FRBNY 
2018a). 
Outcomes 
The TSLF operated between March 27, 2008, and February 1, 2010. Overall, 18 of the 20 
primary dealers participated in the TSLF and 11 participated in the TOP as well. All TSLF 
loans were paid in full and with interest. The Fed collected a total of $781 million in fees 
(Federal Reserve 2010). The TSLF reached its peak utilization of $236 billion on October 1, 
2008. See figures 1 and 2 below. 
Figure 1: TSLF Utilization 
 
Source: GAO 2011. 
____________________________________________________________________ 
12 Lehman Brothers had been an active participant of the TSLF up until the September 11, 2008, auction. The 






Figure 2: List of Primary Dealers of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
 










1 Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC 11 42 1 53 $38.510 
2 Morgan Stanley & Co. Incorporated 6 28 3 34 $36,000 
3 Goldman Sachs & Co. 15 38 2 53 $34,500 
4 Deutsche Bank Securities Inc. 20 32 1 52 $34,284 
5 Citigroup Global Markets Inc. 20 45 2 65 $34,100 
6 RBS Securities Inc. 14 44 1 58 $32,200 
7 Barclays Capital Inc. 21 44 1 65 $26,200 
8 UBS Securities LLC. 4 17 0 21 $23,823 
9 Merrill Lynch Government Securities 
Inc. 
5 34 1 39 $21,777 
10 Lehman Brothers Inc. 5 13 0 18 $19,000 
11 Banc of America Securities LLC 8 15 1 23 $17,203 
12 J.P. Morgan Securities LLC 7 16 2 23 $13,000 
13 BNP Paribas Securities Corp. 9 12 2 21 $11,500 
14 Countrywide Securities Corporation 5 5 0 10 $3,600 
15 Bear Stearns & Co., Inc. 0 2 0 2 $2,000 
16 Dresdner Kleinwort Securities LLC 2 0 0 2 $850 
17 Cantor Fitzgerald & Co. 4 5 0 9 $700 
18 HSBC Securities (USA) Inc. 0 11 0 11 $500 
19 Daiwa Securities America Inc. - - - 0 
 
20 Mizuho Securities USA Inc. - - - 0 
 
21 Jefferies & Company, Inc. (*) - - - 0 
 
22 RBC Capital Markets Corporation (*) - - - 0 
 
 TOTAL 156 403 17 559  
*The institution became a primary dealer in June or July 2009. 
Source: Author’s analysis of Federal Reserve data. 
The FRBNY held a total of 97 TSLF auctions: 58 Schedule 2, 33 Schedule 1, and six TOP. 
Overall, the FRBNY awarded a total of 559 TSLF loans; 156 Schedule 1 and 403 Schedule 2. 
Of the 403 Schedule 2 collateral loans, 17 were TOP. Schedule 2 auctions received the most 
demand. The highest stop-out rates occurred in the Schedule 2 auctions of September 17, 
October 9, and October 15, at 300 bps, 305 bps, and 322 bps, respectively.13  
TSLF auctions started on March 27, 2008, and ran weekly, alternating between Schedule 1 
and Schedule 2, until September 11, 2008. In these first months of operation, the Fed offered 
$175 billion of the available $200 billion: $50 billion for Schedule 1 auctions and $125 billion 
for Schedule 2 auctions. Schedule 1 auctions offered $25 billion on each auction, while 
____________________________________________________________________ 
13 For TSLF data and statistics, see Federal Reserve 2018 and FRBNY 2018b. 
211
Journal of Financial Crises Vol. 2 Iss. 3
 
Schedule 2 auctions alternated offering amounts between $50 billion and $75 billion. See 
figure 3 below. 
Figure 3: Utilization of TSLF Schedule 2 
 
Note: Each bar represents a Schedule 2 auction. In total, there were 58 between March 27, 2008, 
and January 7, 2010. 
Source: Author’s analysis of FRBNY data. 
The initial TSLF auction on March 27, 2008, was Schedule 2. It offered $75 billion in US 
Treasury securities and was oversubscribed. The FRBNY awarded loans to 15 dealers at a 
stop-out rate of 33 bps. Schedule 2 auctions offered a significantly larger amount of US 
Treasury securities compared to Schedule 1, which offered $25 billion in all its TSLF 
auctions. With the exception of the first Schedule 2 auction of March 27, 2008, all Schedule 2 
auctions until September 11, 2008, were undersubscribed. Following the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers on September 15, 2008, Schedule 2 auctions ran weekly, instead of biweekly, and 
the Fed increased its offerings from $125 billion to $150 billion per month. From September 
17, 2008, until April 15, 2009, all Schedule 2 weekly auctions offered $37.5 billion (only three 
$35 billion). 
On September 17, 2008, $70 billion in US Treasury securities were split into two auctions of 
$35 billion each. The first auction introduced a relatively shorter term of 14 days (term 
offered only once), while the one later the same day offered the regular 28-day term. Both of 
the September 17, 2008, auctions were fully subscribed at stop-out rates of 250 bps and 300 
bps, respectively. All Schedule 2 auctions from September 17, 2008, until November 5, 2008, 
were oversubscribed.  
Starting on April 22, 2009, Schedule 2 auctions returned to a biweekly basis and offered 












undersubscribed. Thereafter, participation stopped completely and Schedule 2 auctions 
started to phase out, eventually ending on January 7, 2010. 
Figure 4: Stop-Out Rates for TSLF Schedule 2 
 
Note: The minimum bid rate was 25 bps. No bids after July 16, 2009. The last auction was held on January 
7, 2010. 
Source: Author’s analysis of FRBNY data. 
There were 33 biweekly Schedule 1 auctions between April 3, 2008, and June 25, 2009. Each 
offered $25 billion. After March 19, 2009, there was no participation. From the 26 auctions 
with participation, 14 were undersubscribed. Only three consecutive Schedule 1 auctions in 
the fall of 2008—following Lehman’s bankruptcy—saw a considerable hike in the stop-out 
rate. These were on September 18, October 2, and October 16, with stop-out rates of 151 bps, 
42 bps, and 46 bps, respectively. Overall, 15 auctions awarded loans at a stop-out rate of 10 
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Figure 5: Utilization of TSLF Schedule 1 
 
Note: Each bar represents a Schedule 1 auction. In total, there were 33 between April 3, 2008, 
and June 25, 2009. 
Source: Author’s analysis of FRBNY data. 
Figure 6: Stop-Out Rates for TSLF Schedule 1 
 
Note: The minimum bid rate was 10 bps. No bids after March 19, 2009. The last auction was 
held on June 25, 2009. 
Source: Author’s analysis of FRBNY data. 
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The FRBNY held six TOP auctions between August 27, 2008, and June 3, 2009. The initial two 
auctions of August 27 and September 10 offered $25 billion of US Treasury securities with a 
fixed rate of 25 bps. Both of these auctions were fully subscribed, and dealers were awarded 
the options to borrow US Treasury securities on September 24, at stop-out rates of 2 bps and 
3 bps, respectively. The remaining four TOP auctions offered $50 billion in options. These 
were held in the end of 2008, on November 10, and December 2, and in 2009, on March 3, 
and June 3. The two auctions in 2009 were undersubscribed, and the options awarded were 
not exercised. The TOP ended in July 2009, in view of low demand and improved market 
conditions. 
Figure 7: Utilization of TOP 
 
Note: Each bar represents a TOP auction. In total, there were six between August 27, 2008, and June 
3, 2009. Of notice was that Cantor Fitzgerald & Co. did not exercise a $2 billion option received in 
the first auction. 
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Figure 8: Stop-Out Rates for TOP Options 
 
 












Basis Points 2 3 2 5 1 1 
Note: The FRBNY auctioned options to loan US Treasury securities at a fixed rate, about two to 
three weeks after the auction date. 
Source: FRBNY data. 
Figure 9: Fixed Rates of US Treasury Securities under TOP 
 
 












Basis Points 25 25 50 50 25 25 
Source: FRBNY data. 
II. Key Design Decisions 
1. The Federal Reserve invoked the emergency powers under FRA Section 13(3) to 
establish the Term Securities Lending Facility. 
In March 2008, the 2007–09 financial crisis reached a critical stage. Amid falling house prices 
and downgrades of mortgage-related securities, financial markets became severely 
disrupted. In response, the Federal Reserve Board, in order to act as lender of last resort to 
primary dealers, invoked the emergency powers of Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, 
last used during the Great Depression in the 1930s. Under Section 13(3), the Board could 
decide to lend to nondepository institutions in “unusual and exigent circumstances.” The 
approval of a majority vote of the FOMC was also required because the action would affect 
open market operations. On March 10, 2008, with a unanimous vote of the five sitting Board 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System and a 9–0 vote of the FOMC, the TSLF was approved 
(Bernanke 2015). 
2. The TSLF was administered by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 
The Fed, primarily through the FRBNY, crafted the TSLF. In the open market operations, the 
FRBNY trades US government securities with designated primary dealers (securities firms) 
on a regular basis. The TSLF took advantage of existing infrastructure and some similarities 
in design with the OMOs (Federal Reserve 2009; Geithner 2014). 




In view of the great demand in the markets for US Treasury securities as a “safe haven,” the 
FRBNY lent highly liquid US Treasury securities such as Treasury bills, notes, bonds, and 
inflation-indexed securities, at a 28-day term—much longer than the overnight term—and 
against a broader range of collateral. Initially, the list of eligible collateral included collateral 
that was illiquid at the time, such as triple-A private-label residential mortgage-backed 
securities and commercial MBS, as well as agency collateralized mortgage obligations. The 
FRBNY drew the US Treasury securities from the System Open Market Account. After 
financial markets improved in June 2009, the Fed reduced its size to $75 billion. The TSLF 
ended in February 2010 (Federal Reserve 2009; Federal Reserve 2010). 
4. The TSLF lent highly liquid US Treasury securities, not cash. 
While other Fed lending facilities involved cash, the TSLF involved only securities. Through 
the TSLF, primary dealers settled repurchase agreements in which they received highly 
liquid US Treasury securities in exchange for less liquid securities. 
Officials from the FRBNY have stated that the TSLF, as a securities-for-securities lending 
program, did not affect the supply of bank reserves and that “the benefit was that the Fed 
was not adding more cash to the economy and therefore did not have to take offsetting 
actions to manage the fed funds rate. This was a key difference in TSLF from the Single-
Tranche repo program and from the Primary Dealer Credit Facility, and meant it could be 
scaled up or down more quickly” (Logan, Nelson, and Parkinson 2018). 
5. TSLF loans were recourse. 
The loans were recourse. That is, in case of default, the Fed could go after the primary 
dealer’s assets to claim for the difference between the liquidation of the pledged collateral 
and the value of the loan (GAO 2011). 
6. Participation was limited to the 20 primary dealers of the FRB-NY. 
Only the 20 primary dealers of the FRBNY, including the five largest US investment banks 
and the US securities arms of major foreign financial institutions, were eligible to participate 
in the TSLF (Fed 2008). 
7. The FRBNY awarded loans through weekly auctions. 
With an auction mechanism, the Fed intended to encourage broad participation and avoid 
any stigmatization in using this facility. The upper limits for primary dealers on the share of 
the auction that they could get guaranteed that multiple of them would be awarded TSLF 
loans. The TSLF consisted of weekly auctions that lasted for 30 minutes. The day before an 
auction, the Fed announced the amount and securities offered. Participation was voluntary 
and bids represented the fee dealers intended to pay to loan the offered US Treasury 
securities. Auction results were communicated shortly thereafter (Federal Reserve 2008b). 
8. The auctions were classified into two categories, including a Schedule 2 for 
relatively illiquid assets. 
Auctions were classified into two categories: Schedule 1 and Schedule 2. While Schedule 1 
auctions accepted all collateral eligible in FRBNY open market operations, Schedule 2 
auctions accepted a much broader and less liquid range of collateral and required a higher 
minimum bid. The two different schedules were intended “to better calibrate the interest 
rate on TSLF loans to the level of risk associated with the collateral” (GAO 2011). 
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Schedule 1 eligible collateral included: Treasury securities, agency debt securities, and 
agency MBS.; whereas Schedule 2 collateral included: all Schedule 1 eligible collateral, plus 
triple-A private-label residential MBS and commercial MBS, and agency CMOs (FRBNY 
2008a). On April 29, 2008, Schedule 2 collateral was expanded to include triple-A asset-
backed securities (Federal Reserve 2008b). And on September 14, 2008, a day prior to the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers, the Board and the FOMC broadened the list to include all 
investment-grade debt securities (BBB- or higher) (Federal Reserve 2008c). 
9. The TSLF weekly auctions alternated between Schedule 1 and Schedule 2 collateral 
and the timing was revised shortly before Lehman Brothers failed. 
TSLF auctions started on March 27, 2008, and ran weekly, alternating between Schedule 1 
and Schedule 2, until September 11, 2008. In these first months of operation, the Fed offered 
$175 billion of the available $200 billion: $50 billion for Schedule 1 auctions and $125 billion 
for Schedule 2 auctions. Schedule 1 auctions offered $25 billion each, while Schedule 2 
auctions alternated offering amounts between $50 billion and $75 billion.  
On September 14, 2008, one day before Lehman filed for bankruptcy, the Fed revised the 
timing of Schedule 2 auctions to run weekly, rather than biweekly. It also increased the size 
from $125 billion to $150 billion per month. From September 17, 2008, until April 15, 2009, 
all Schedule 2 weekly auctions offered $37.5 billion (only three $35 billion). As financial 
conditions improved in 2009, the size and timing of Schedule 2 auctions was decreased, and 
they eventually ended on January 7, 2010. 
10.  Margins (haircuts) were imposed according to the type of collateral. 
The FRBNY determined margin requirements. These did not change throughout the crisis. 
Haircuts aimed to reduce the Fed’s risk in case of bankruptcy of a primary dealer (Federal 
Reserve 2009). Additionally, collateral on review for downgrade was not accepted. For 
securities posted as collateral that were on review for downgrade, the Fed could demand 
that they be replaced with other eligible securities (FRBNY 2009). 
11. Two clearing banks provided the custody and valuation of collateral. 
The FRBNY relied on the clearing services of the existing clearing banks in the triparty repo 
market, JPMorgan Chase and Bank of New York Mellon. They functioned as intermediaries 
and provided the services of custody and valuation of collateral. Their services came at no 
charge to the Federal Reserve or borrowers. 
The clearing banks conducted daily revaluations of collateral to make sure the specified 
margin was applied. The US Treasury securities awarded remained in the clearing banks, but 
dealers could use them to settle repo contracts. In case the value of the collateral decreased, 
the FRBNY could ask for substitutions. On the other hand, primary dealers could also 
substitute collateral for other eligible collateral if needed. To value the pledged collateral, 
clearing banks used the lowest price available in their valuation systems (Federal Reserve 
2009). 
12.  Minimum bids were set at levels considered low during the crisis but high during 
normal times. 
The minimum bid for Schedule 1 auctions was 10 bps and for Schedule 2 was higher at 25 
bps. There was no cost to place a bid (FRBNY 2008). Many of the Fed’s lending programs 




rates and collateral requirements were set to be attractive when markets were disrupted but 
unattractive when markets functioned well (Kohn 2008). 
13.  Primary dealers had a limit on borrowing. 
Primary dealers could place up to two bids, with a minimum amount of $10 million and not 
higher than 20% of the total offered amount. In case of two bids, they could only be in 
increments of $10 million. Primary dealers could be awarded a maximum of only 20% of the 
total offering amount, regardless if the auction was undersubscribed. The Fed set limits “to 
ensure that the lending [was] distributed across multiple institutions” (Logan 2009). The 
FRBNY held the right to refuse any bid at its own discretion (FRBNY 2008a). Awards were 
determined on a pro rata basis, and dealers were not allowed to terminate a loan early 
(Federal Reserve 2008). 
14.  Loans were awarded at a uniform fee, based on the lowest accepted bid—the 
“stop-out rate.” 
At the end of the auction, the uniform fee was set based on the stop-out rate, which was the 
lowest accepted bid (GAO 2011). 
15. The TSLF Options Program was an extension to the TSLF. 
The TOP was approved on July 24, 2008, and announced on July 30, 2008. It was an extension 
to the TSLF and required administrative changes pursuant to Schedule 2 auctions and not 
another FRA Section 13(3) authorization. The TOP intended to provide primary dealers 
some relief during periods of “heightened collateral market pressure, such as quarter-end 
dates.” 
The new program authorized the FRBNY to offer “options” to loan US Treasury securities for 
a seven-day term, two to three weeks after the auction date and at a fixed rate. In some way, 
the TOP was a pre-auction that gave primary dealers the guarantee that they could have 
access to liquid assets at a later date, without the commitment to exercise the options. The 
TOP was limited to $50 billion in US Treasury securities, on top of the $200 billion of 
Schedule 1 and Schedule 2 programs. The minimum bid rate was 1 bp, and all Schedule 2 
collateral was eligible. The day before each TOP auction, the FRBNY announced the terms 
and conditions, including the fixed rate of the loans. The TOP held its first auction on August 
27, 2008 (OIG 2010.). 
16. While the TSLF was operational, the identity of the borrowers was undisclosed. 
While the TSLF was in operation, the Fed published information on awards, stop-out rates, 
and bid-to-cover ratios, but it did not disclose the identity of the participant primary dealers 
or the bid propositions. 
In July 2010, the US Congress passed Dodd-Frank. The measures included to promote 
transparency required the Fed to disclose certain information on their emergency lending 
programs. In regard to the TSLF, on December 1, 2010, the Fed disclosed detailed 
information about borrowers between December 1, 2007, and July 21, 2010. The 
information included the identity of the borrowers, dates, type and amounts of financial 
assistance provided, the interest charged, and pledged collateral. 
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III. Evaluation 
The nature of the TSLF as one of many temporary emergency lending facilities makes it hard 
to evaluate. However, it would be useful to consider at least three components: 1) the effects 
the announcement had on financial markets, 2) the effectiveness of the TSLF in providing 
relief to primary dealers or the repo market, and 3) the auction design and legislative tools. 
The effect of the TSLF announcement is unclear. While Fed Chairman Bernanke (2015) was 
of the opinion that “market participants applauded,” US Treasury Secretary Paulson (2010) 
thought that “… the opposite happened. It was an indication of the markets’ jitters that some 
took the move as a confirmation of their worst fears: things must be very serious indeed for 
the Fed to take such unprecedented action.” 
Fleming, Hrung, and Keane (2010) and Hrung and Seligman (2011) have argued that the 
TSLF contributed in the reduction of stress on repo markets. Acharya et al. (2017), using 
proprietary data, concluded that primary dealers that possessed less liquid collateral, lower 
equity returns, and greater leverage prior to the crisis were more inclined to borrow and at 
higher bidding rates. 
The Fed’s emergency lending facilities under Section 13(3), such as the TSLF, raised concerns 
among the public for the lack of transparency on the valuation of pledged collateral and the 
undisclosed identity of the borrowers. In May 2008, a Bloomberg News reporter requested 
that the Fed Board, under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and via email, provide 
detailed information with respect to securities posted as collateral for multiple emergency 
lending facilities, such as the TSLF. In the court case Bloomberg L.P. v. Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System, Fed officials cited adverse effects to the disclosure of the 
detailed information such as stigma and the potential reluctance of borrowers to use the 
facilities in the future. In addition, they added that the disclosure of “highly sensitive” 
information could cause “substantial competitive harm.” Furthermore, the “public disclosure 
of information regarding specific securities pledges as collateral for individual TSLF loans 
would significantly harm the Government’s monetary functions or commercial interests” 
(Logan 2009; Madigan 2009). Ultimately, in 2011, the court ruled that the Fed was required 
to release some of the information solicited.  
In July 2010, the Congress passed Dodd-Frank. Measures to promote transparency required 
the Fed to disclose information on their emergency lending programs between 2007 and 
2010. In regard to the TSLF, on December 1, 2010, the Fed disclosed detailed information 
about borrowers between December 1, 2007, and July 21, 2010. The information included 
the identity of the borrowers, dates, type and amounts of financial assistance provided, the 
interest charged, and pledged collateral.14 It appears that the TSLF as a temporary 
emergency lending facility had an implicit agreement that specific information on 
participants was going to remain undisclosed. However, the outcome of the Bloomberg FOIA 
case and the Dodd-Frank act required the Fed to be more transparent. These outcomes have 
set a precedent that could change the perceptions of the Fed and primary dealers in 
designing a similar facility in the future. 
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FOMC Statement: Federal Reserve and Other Central Banks Announce Specific Measures 
Designed to Address Liquidity Pressures in Funding Markets (March 11, 2008) – The Federal 
Reserve, in conjunction with the Bank of Canada, the Bank of England, the European Central 
Bank, and the Swiss National Bank announced measures to address liquidity, which included 
the establishment of the TSLF. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FOMC_Fed_central_banks_a
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Federal Reserve Announces Steps to Enhance the Effectiveness of Its Existing Liquidity 
Facilities (July 30, 2008) – The Federal Reserve expanded the TSLF to include a TSLF Options 
Program for $50 billion. It offered primary dealers through auctions the option to borrow U.S. 
Treasury securities for a 7-day term, two to three weeks after the auction date and at a fixed 
rate. The Federal Reserve intended to “offer such options for exercise in advance of periods that 






Federal Reserve Board Announces Several Initiatives to Provide Additional Support to 
Financial Markets, Including Enhancements to Its Existing Liquidity Facilities (September 
14, 2008). – The Federal Reserve Board announced multiple initiatives to support financial 
markets, including enhancements to existing liquidity facilities. The collateral for the TSLF was 
expanded for Schedule 2 auctions to include all investment-grade debt securities. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FRB_PR_09-14-2008.pdf. 
Federal Reserve Announces the Extension of Three Liquidity Facilities through April 30, 
2009 (December 2, 2008) – Due to continuing strains in financial markets, the Federal Reserve 





Federal Reserve Announces Extension through October 30, 2009, of Its Existing Liquidity 
Programs That Were Scheduled to Expire on April 30, 2009 (February 3, 2009)  – The Federal 
Reserve extended through October 30, 2009 liquidity programs scheduled to expire on April 30, 






Federal Reserve Announces Extensions of and Modifications to a Number of Its Liquidity 
Programs (June 25, 2009) – The Federal Reserve, in view of very weak demand for TSLF 
auctions in previous months, suspended TSLF Schedule 1 and TSLF Options Program auctions. 





Federal Reserve Announces Term Auction Facility (TAF) and Term Securities Lending 
Facility (TSLF) Schedules through January 2010 (September 24, 2009) – The Federal Reserve 
extended TAF and TSLF operations through January 2010. In light of continuing improvements 






Federal Reserve Releases Detailed Information about Transactions Conducted to Stabilize 
Markets during the Recent Financial Crisis (December 1, 2010) – As required by the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, the Federal Reserve posted 
transaction-level details from December 1, 2007, to July 21, 2010, on multiple lending facilities 
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Term Securities Lending Facility: Announcements (Accessed December 12, 2018) – The 






Opportunities Exist to Strengthen Policies and Processes for Managing Emergency 
Assistance, July 2011 (US Government Accountability Office 2011) – As directed by the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, the US Government Accountability 
Office conducted an audit of theemergency loan programs and other assistance authorized by 
the Federal Reserve Board during the 2007-09 financial crisis. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/GAO_Report_07-2011.pdf.  
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Appendix A: TSLF Timeline 
 
Date Event 
Mar/11/2008 TSLF announced. Auctions of highly liquid US Treasury securities to primary dealers of up to 




TSLF details and eligible collateral for each type of auction announced: 
Schedule 1: $50 billion per month. 
Auctions of $25 billion each. 
Treasury securities, agency debt securities, and agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS). 
Schedule 2: $125 billion per month. 
Alternating auctions of $50 billion and $75 billion. 
All Schedule 1 eligible collateral, triple-A private-label residential MBS and commercial MBS, 
and agency collateralized mortgage obligations. 
Mar/27/2008 First TSLF auction: Schedule 2 for $75 billion. 
Apr/29/2008 Schedule 2: eligible collateral expanded to include triple-A asset-backed securities (ABS). 
Jul/24/2008 TSLF Options Program (TOP) of $50 billion approved. 
TSLF extended until January 30, 2009. 
Aug/27/2008 First TOP auction. 
Sep/14/2008 Schedule 2: size increased from $125 billion to $150 billion per month. 
Auctions to run weekly for $37.5 billion (most cases). 
Eligible collateral expanded to include all investment-grade securities (BBB- or higher). 
Sep/15/2008 Lehman Brothers collapsed. The largest bankruptcy in US history. 
Oct/01/2008 TSLF reaches its peak usage of $236 billion. 
Dec/02/2008 TSLF extended until April 30, 2009. 
Jan/27/2009 TSLF extended through October 30, 2009. 
Jun/03/2009 Last TOP auction. 
Jun/23/2009 TSLF extended until February 1, 2010, but only for Schedule 2 auctions. 
Schedule 2: size decreased to $75 billion per month. 
Auctions to run once a month. 
Jun/25/2009 Last Schedule 1 auction. 
Jul/16/2009 Last Schedule 2 loans given. 
Sep/22/2009 Schedule 2: size decreased to $50 billion for October and $25 billion thereafter. 
Jan/07/2010 Last Schedule 2 auction. 
Feb/01/2010 TSLF ended. 
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